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dc.contributor.authorShepherd, Joshua
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-07T22:37:01Z
dc.date.available2025-03-07T22:37:01Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.date.submitted2021-06-07T12:35:04Z
dc.identifierhttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49427
dc.identifier.urihttps://doab-dev.siscern.org/handle/20.500.12854/169551
dc.description.abstractDebates surrounding free will are notorious for their intractability. This is so in spite of the fact that, even at a fairly fine grain of analysis, competing views on the nature of free will are well understood. Why can’t philosophers find common ground? One line of thought that has emerged fairly recently draws on the psychology of concepts. The general idea is that an explanation for persistent disagreement about free will, and perhaps guidance toward resolution, might be found by exploring the psychological roots of “our concept” of free will—for example, those psychological factors that underlie our tendencies to say, of some bit of human behavior, that it was performed of an agent’s own free will, or not.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.rightsopen access
dc.subject.otherfree will; psychology
dc.subject.otherthema EDItEUR::Q Philosophy and Religion::QD Philosophy
dc.titleChapter 4 The Folk Psychological Roots of Free Will
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedByf75587da-2374-4722-9d42-9fffa7fa3f92
oapen.relation.isPartOfBooke0385286-d130-4c69-8b8c-7478c83686ff
oapen.relation.isFundedByf6fcd900-36e2-4bc9-939e-ad820802e21f
oapen.relation.isFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd
oapen.collectionWellcome
oapen.pages14
oapen.place.publicationLondon
dc.relationisFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd


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