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dc.contributor.authorPugh, Jonathan
dc.contributor.authorKahane, Guy
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-08T03:41:42Z
dc.date.available2025-03-08T03:41:42Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.date.submitted2021-06-17T09:44:08Z
dc.identifierhttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/49607
dc.identifier.urihttps://doab-dev.siscern.org/handle/20.500.12854/177682
dc.description.abstractWe consider a strategy for justifying bio-conservative opposition to enhancement according to which we should resist radical departures from human nature, not because human nature possesses any intrinsic value, but because it is our nature. The idea is that we can be partial to humanity in the same way that common sense morality allows us to be partial to self, family, lovers, friends or our country. Whilst a similar idea was suggested by Bernard Williams and Jerry Cohen, it was not fully developed, and their arguments fail to mount a serious challenge to many forms of enhancement. We explore a better approach, drawing on recent literature about the nature and grounds of partiality, and attempt to elucidate what partiality for humanity might plausibly involve. We argue, however, that even if such partiality for humanity is defensible, it can at most only set limits on enhancement.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.rightsopen access
dc.subject.otherhuman enhancement; bioconservatives
dc.subject.otherthema EDItEUR::P Mathematics and Science::PS Biology, life sciences::PSB Biochemistry
dc.titleChapter 12 Partiality for Humanity and Enhancement
dc.typechapter
oapen.relation.isPublishedBydb4e319f-ca9f-449a-bcf2-37d7c6f885b1
oapen.relation.isPartOfBookd838646d-27cb-4a52-9db1-596c316ade7e
oapen.relation.isFundedByf6fcd900-36e2-4bc9-939e-ad820802e21f
oapen.relation.isFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd
oapen.collectionWellcome
oapen.pages11
oapen.place.publicationOxford
dc.relationisFundedByd859fbd3-d884-4090-a0ec-baf821c9abfd


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