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dc.contributor.authorHenke, Benjamin
dc.contributor.authorWeksler, Assaf
dc.date.accessioned2025-03-08T08:01:22Z
dc.date.available2025-03-08T08:01:22Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.date.submitted2023-11-16T09:32:20Z
dc.identifierhttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/85154
dc.identifier.urihttps://doab-dev.siscern.org/handle/20.500.12854/188671
dc.description.abstractWhen viewing a circular coin rotated in depth, it fills an elliptical region of the distal scene. For some, this appears to generate a two-fold experience, in which one sees the coin as simultaneously circular (in light of its 3D shape) and elliptical (in light of its 2D ‘perspectival shape’ or ‘p-shape’). An energetic philosophical debate asks whether the latter p-shapes are genuinely presented in perceptual experience (as ‘perspectivalists’ argue) or if, instead, this appearance is somehow derived or inferred from experience (as ‘anti-perspectivalists’ argue). This debate, however, has largely turned on introspection. In a recent study, Morales et al. (2020) aim to provide the first empirical test of this question. They asked subjects to find an elliptical coin seen face-on from a search array that also included a circular coin seen either face-on or at an angle. They found that subjects reacted more slowly when the distracting circle was seen at an angle, such that its p-shape matched that of the target ellipse. From this, they concluded that the similar p-shape between the ellipse and circle constituted a phenomenal similarity between the two, and thus that perspectivalism is true. We show that these results can also be explained by pre-attentive guidance by unconscious representations (in what follows, just “unconscious pre-attentive guidance”) and that this explanation is at least as plausible as one from phenomenal similarity. Thus, we conclude that the experiment does not support perspectivalism over anti-perspectivalism.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.rightsopen access
dc.subject.otherattention; higher-order theories of consciousness; inattentional blindness; masking; mental qualities; neurophenomenal structuralism; phenomenal content; unconscious mental states
dc.titleChapter 16 (Un)conscious Perspectival Shape and Attention Guidance in Visual Search
dc.title.alternativeA Reply to Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020)
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.4324/ 9781003409526- 20
oapen.relation.isPublishedByfa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0
oapen.relation.isPartOfBookef2101bc-cad8-4fa4-894b-c91f9760dfef
oapen.relation.isFundedBy1e494ac1-76fa-4252-bcf2-5b03efff937b
oapen.relation.isFundedBy7b594309-7322-4938-b810-989a6a6d4872
oapen.relation.isbn9781032529790
oapen.relation.isbn9781032529745
oapen.imprintRoutledge
oapen.pages19
dc.relationisFundedBy7b594309-7322-4938-b810-989a6a6d4872
dc.anonymitySingle-anonymised
dc.peerreviewidbc80075c-96cc-4740-a9f3-a234bc2598f1
dc.peerreviewtitleProposal review
dc.openreviewNo
dc.responsibilityPublisher
dc.stagePre-publication
dc.reviewtypeProposal
dc.reviewertypeInternal editor
dc.reviewertypeExternal peer reviewer


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