Die Stiftung „Russkij mir“
Ideologie, Ziele und Netzwerk
| dc.contributor.author | Meienberger, Alexander | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-11-24T11:21:08Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-11-24T11:21:08Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2024 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2025-08-05T14:18:33Z | |
| dc.identifier | ONIX_20250805T161025_9783412529758_20 | |
| dc.identifier | https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/105012 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://doab-dev.siscern.org/handle/20.500.12854/204810 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The Russkij Mir Foundation was established in 2007 to promote Russian language and culture abroad. Its work and methods have since become highly controversial. The EU declared the foundation a propaganda tool of Russia in 2016 and imposed sanctions against it in 2022. In his study, Alexander Meienberger examines how the foundation functions as an instrument of Russian soft power. The focus is on the foundation's work in Germany and Austria. The foundation's activities can be characterized in three aspects. First, it operates in many countries without transparency and, in some cases, in gray areas. Even its financial and personnel structures are opaque. Second, it has no general strategy for its work abroad; rather, it acts on a situation- and location-specific basis. Third, the foundation's work assumes loyalty to the regime ruling in Russia. This fact is reflected both in its internal structures and in its work abroad. At the conceptual level, the foundation promotes "great" Russian culture, the ideology of the "Russian World," national patriotism, and conservative values. It also likes to present itself as the protector of Russian compatriots abroad, thereby intervening in the internal affairs of a state. | |
| dc.language | German | |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Osteuropa in Geschichte und Gegenwart | |
| dc.rights | open access | |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::N History and Archaeology::NH History::NHT History: specific events and topics | |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::1 Place qualifiers::1D Europe::1DF Central Europe::1DFA Austria | |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::1 Place qualifiers::1D Europe::1DF Central Europe::1DFG Germany | |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::1 Place qualifiers::1D Europe::1DT Eastern Europe::1DTA Russia | |
| dc.subject.classification | thema EDItEUR::3 Time period qualifiers::3M c 1500 onwards to present day::3MR 21st century, c 2000 to c 2100::3MRB Early 21st century c 2000 to c 2050 | |
| dc.subject.other | Russian soft power | |
| dc.subject.other | Russian world | |
| dc.subject.other | Russkij mir | |
| dc.subject.other | Russian propaganda | |
| dc.title | Die Stiftung „Russkij mir“ | |
| dc.title.alternative | Ideologie, Ziele und Netzwerk | |
| dc.type | book | |
| oapen.identifier.doi | 10.7788/9783412529758 | |
| oapen.relation.isPublishedBy | 33fecb33-e7c4-4fc8-96b0-7ba2fccafba9 | |
| oapen.relation.isbn | 9783412529758 | |
| oapen.relation.isbn | 9783412529741 | |
| oapen.imprint | Böhlau | |
| oapen.pages | 275 | |
| oapen.place.publication | Köln | |
| dc.seriesnumber | 12 | |
| dc.abstractotherlanguage | The Russkij Mir Foundation was established in 2007 to promote Russian language and culture abroad. Its work and methods have since become highly controversial. The EU declared the foundation a propaganda tool of Russia in 2016 and imposed sanctions against it in 2022. In his study, Alexander Meienberger examines how the foundation functions as an instrument of Russian soft power. The focus is on the foundation's work in Germany and Austria. The foundation's activities can be characterized in three aspects. First, it operates in many countries without transparency and, in some cases, in gray areas. Even its financial and personnel structures are opaque. Second, it has no general strategy for its work abroad; rather, it acts on a situation- and location-specific basis. Third, the foundation's work assumes loyalty to the regime ruling in Russia. This fact is reflected both in its internal structures and in its work abroad. At the conceptual level, the foundation promotes "great" Russian culture, the ideology of the "Russian World," national patriotism, and conservative values. It also likes to present itself as the protector of Russian compatriots abroad, thereby intervening in the internal affairs of a state. |
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